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ination.1 Shleifer and Vishny (1989) solve the free-rider problem by allowing the raider to acquire a substantial proportion of shares before formally announcing her takeover intention, but disclosure laws under the Williams Act require the raider to reveal her takeover intention.2 In contrast, dilution is legal, voluntary, straightforward, and widespread. Thus, we consider our focus on dilution to highlight the welfare tradeoffs from takeovers to be well justified.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II documents empirically the importance of dilution and managerial defense in the market for corporate takeovers. Section III describes the model, which incorporates manage? rial resistance to takeovers. Section IV analyzes the simplest case, where both the firm's potential (post-takeover) value and the cost of takeover are known with cer?
tainty. Section V extends the analysis to a more realistic scenario, where both the cost of takeovers and the potential value of the firm are uncertain.3 Concluding remarks, including discussion of policy insights and directions for future research, compose Section VI.
II. Dilution and Defensive Restructuring
A.
Dilutions and the Corporate Charter Dilution is the extent to which a raider can exclude minority (non-tendering)
shareholders from acquiring post-raid gains. A two-tier, front-end-loaded tender offer is an effective mechanism for dilution. A raider structures a bid promising to buy a certain percentage of the firm at a first-tier price and, after acquiring majority control, offers a lower price for the remaining shares. Such a mechanism dilutes the property rights of shareholders who do not tender shares immediately.4
Alternatively, the raider may be able to effect dilution (for minority shareholders) by transferring assets from the acquired firm to another firm owned by the raider at a steep discount?below market value.5 Other diluting practices may also involve supplying over-priced inputs to the target or buying under-priced products from the target.
Corporate charters do not contain a dollar figure for permissible dilution. The maximum dilution level is instead determined by the company's disclosure and appraisal requirement policy (after a takeover).6 Changing these policies usually requires the board's consent. A majority of Fortune 500 companies have amended their charter provisions to include "fair price amendments." These ensure that all shares be bought at the same price, reducing a raider's ability to discriminate ^ore than 85% of Fortune 500 companies have such provisions in their corporate charters. 2Firms can, however, acquire up to 5% of a firm's shares before 13-D filing, i.e., before publicly declaring the purpose of acquiring stocks.
3The intermediate cases, where only the cost of takeover is uncertain and where only the potential value ofthe firm is uncertain, are available in Chakraborty and Arnott (1994) . 4Mesa Petroleum's two-tier bid for General American Oil Company is a good example of how two-tier bids help small companies finance acquisitions of large companies (Lipton et al. (1989) ).
5A good example of such an asset transfer can be found in Texas Air's acquisition of Eastern. Eastern's computer reservation system, which was valued (by independent analysts) at $300-$400 million, was transferred to Texas Air for about $100 million (Swoboda (1989) ).
6The Williams Amendment to the 1934 Securities Exchange Act provides a legal basis for restricting dilution by recognizing the possibility of "minority squeeze out." between tendering and non-tendering shareholders. Similarly, a firm might curb potential dilution by incorporating minority shareholders' rights to dissent and appraisal in the corporate charter.7 Thus, corporate charters and security laws can effectively set limits on dilution. What should these limits be?8 Dilution is not necessary for takeovers. Scharfstein (1988) shows how a value-maximizing raid without dilution can take place when raiders are better in? formed than shareholders.
Similarly, Bagnoli and Lipman (1989) demonstrate how free-riding incentives can be overcome when there are pivotal shareholders. But shareholders cannot depend on the presence of an informed raider or a pivotal shareholder to make value-maximizing raids occur. In contrast, dilution clauses can be written into corporate charters (or other takeover-related laws), ensuring that the presence and magnitude of dilution are public information. The volun?
tary adoption and transparency of such clauses ensure that they will hold under all circumstances, making them a reliable and effective instrument to encourage raids.
Finally, it has been argued that dilution clauses are largely redundant since, whatever the level of dilution, executive compensation can be structured so that managers operate in the shareholders' interest. The proliferation of stock options in managerial compensation would appear to support this argument. However, empirical evidence on the sensitivity of executive compensation to firm perfor? mance is tenuous. Jensen and Murphy (1990a), (1990b) investigated over 3000 CEOs from 1974 to 1988 and found that a $1000 change in corporate value corre? sponds to a change in CEO compensation of only $2.59-$3.25.9
Yermack (1995) finds little evidence to suggest that stock options are designed to reduce expected agency costs.10 Moreover, the recent emergence of executive equity swaps (Bolster et al. (1996) ) and the use of zero-cost collars ( (Bettis et al. (1999) ) is bound to reduce the effectiveness of stock options.11 Hence, creating an environment (through specific corporate bylaws) that facilitates takeovers is an attractive and reliable way to align managers' incentives to shareholders' interests. 7GH (1980b) provide an extensive analysis of how provisions in the corporate charter affect mon? etary levels of dilution. 8In this paper, dilution always refers to the maximum permissible exclusion ofthe minority share? holders' property rights. Also, for tractability, we restrict our model to a relatively narrow definition of dilution?dilution-related clauses in the corporate charter. Dilution in its broader sense refers to all actions that dilute property rights ofthe target shareholders and is not limited to corporate charters. 9They also report that the pay for performance relationship weakened over the period of study and that CEO compensation was no more sensitive to firm performance than was compensation for hourly and salaried employees.
10Hall and Liebman (1998) document a significant rise in the sensitivity of pay to performance in the 1990s, when CEOs' holding of stock and stock options are considered as a part ofthe compensation package. However, they note that the current relationship between CEO pay and firm performance remains weak.
nAn executive equity swap is a privately traded contract through which executives can reduce their exposure to equity holding while maintaining their voting rights: "A typical executive equity swap transaction specifies a certain number of shares under the contract with the executive receiving quarterly interest payment from an alternative investment of similar notional value, such as a floatingrate security. The executive, in turn, pays the derivative dealer any dividend paid by the firm on the shares he/she owns. At the end ofthe life ofthe swap, normally a few years later, the executive pays the dealer the accumulated gains on the stock and receives the compensation for the losses." (Bolster etal . (1996), p. 101) The firm's incumbent manager decides on the machine's use. The more productive the effort he puts into researching alternative uses, a > 0, the better his choice and, consequently, the greater the machine's output, q(d)\ thus, q'(a) > 0. We term q(a) the status quo value ofthe firm. For whatever reason?perhaps expe? rience, perhaps privileged information, perhaps patented production processes? there may be another agent, the raider, who can make more productive use of the machine. The machine's output under the raider is denoted by V, the potential value of the firm (a tilde denotes a random variable). JTo acquire the machine, the raider must incur an out-of-pocket takeover cost, C. For the takeover to be successful, the raider must have her tender price, T, accepted by the shareholders. When the takeover is successful, the incumbent manager is fired. The manager, therefore, works to reduce the probability of takeover by increasing either pro? ductive effort or defensive effort, b > 0, both of which are noncontractible. An increase in defensive effort increases the expected cost of takeover. Shareholders 12Leveraged payout in this study refers to borrowing money to pay out large special dividends or to buy back 30% or more of the company stock. For a detailed analysis of such restructuring, see Jensen (1986) iii) The potential value of the firm and the cost of takeover are realized and become common knowledge.
iv) The raider chooses whether to make a tender offer. If she chooses not to make a tender offer, she incurs no takeover cost. In this situation, we say that the takeover is thwarted. If she does make an offer, it will be the one that is accepted and takeover occurs. The raider incurs the realized takeover cost and receives her realized payoff, V ? T ? C, where T is the tender price. 
Thus, the shareholder's problem is to (3) maxS(<?) = P(#)fc[max[v-#,4(fl(#))]] + (l-?(#)) ?(a(#)), where S($) is the return to shareholders as a function of <?, and ?c[-] is the ex?
pectations operator conditional on takeover. The shareholder's choice of dilution factor involves a tradeoff among three effects. With managerial effort fixed, an increase in dilution increases the probability of raid, which by itself is to the share? holder's benefit. But higher dilution also gives the raider a larger portion of the surplus from a raid, which hurts the shareholder. Finally, an increase in dilution causes the manager to alter both productive and defensive effort. As we shall see, this effect can go either way.
15Our cost function captures the manager's ability to increase the cost of takeover by expending defensive effort to restructure the firm. Managers may also choose to increase the cost of takeover by implementing a variety of other policies. For example, a manager could choose to issue poison pill security or enact a variety of anti-takeover amendments to increase the cost of takeover. A generalized cost function such as KC(b), with K representing a scaling factor that measures the effectiveness of these policies, can capture these considerations. A manager then chooses productive effort (a), defensive effort (b), and K to maximize utility. For the sake of simplicity, we do not explicitly model the choice of K. Our cost function highlights the impact of managerial defensive effort on the cost of takeover given a particular defensive technology. Our goal is to highlight the impact of defensive restructuring, which (unlike K) is difficult to monitor or regulate.
16We assume here that managers do not require higher salaries with a higher level of dilution. In Appendix 1, we show that the qualitative results of our model remain unchanged when there is a managerial participation constraint.
One could also allow for the manager to be paid partially in stock. If he were paid a prespecified proportion of the stock, for example, his decision problem would become Having characterized equilibrium, we shall investigate its (constrained) effi?
ciency. To keep our analysis comparable to GH, we assume that society's objec? tive is to maximize the expected net value (expected value of the firm net of the expected takeover cost) of the firm, which equals the sum of expected returns to shareholders and the raider.17 Then, the socially optimal level of $ solves (4) maxW(^) = P($)SC \v-C(b($))] + (l -?(#)) q(a($)).
IV. No Uncertainty
As noted earlier, the choice of dilution factor is a complex incentive problem.
A change in $ will generally affect the manager's choices of productive and de? fensive effort, the raider's choice of tender price, and the shareholder's tendering decision. In choosing the level of dilution, the shareholder maximizes share value subject to the various incentive constraints. We start by examining the manager's choice of productive and defensive effort, given a level of dilution, when there is no uncertainty concerning either takeover cost or the potential value of the firm.
A. The Manager's Problem
We examine the manager's choice of efforts conditional on thwarting takeover and then conditional on not thwarting takeover. We then obtain his unconditional choice of efforts as a function of $.
Conditional on thwarting the takeover bid, the manager's problem is, from The intuition is that productive effort suddenly becomes more valuable since, at the margin, it is thwarting the takeover, while defensive effort suddenly becomes less valuable since it is now sharing with productive effort the task of thwarting the takeover rather than doing the job alone.
Suppose, instead, that the manager does not thwart the takeover. Since the raid is successful, the manager gets fired. We assume that he then receives a level of utility corresponding to the indifference curve through the origin Uq. Then he has no incentive to exert either productive or defensive effort. The way Figure 1 is drawn, whatever the level of <?, the manager chooses to thwart the takeover since the minimum utility from doing so, Ul, exceeds Uo. Suppose instead Uo > Ul.
Then, for low levels of dilution (for #<<?>, where <? is the level of dilution for which $ ? C(b) is tangent to Uo), the manager would choose to thwart the takeover defensively, while for higher levels of dilution, he would choose not to thwart the takeover.
We are now in a position to solve the shareholder's and the planner's choices of dilution. We refer to the two levels of dilution as the privately and socially optimal levels of dilution. Since the manager thwarts takeover whatever the level of dilution, the opti? mal level of dilution from both the shareholder's and society's perspective is that which maximizes the manager's productive effort and, hence, the status quo value of the firm. This will never entail a level of dilution such that the manager thwarts the raid defensively, since any such level of dilution would result in the value of the firm being lower than the no-dilution value (#(<zm))-If aM < cll, the optimal level of dilution is such that the manager thwarts the raid offensively, $ > 4. ln this case, shareholders incorporate dilution even though the raid does not succeed since the threat of raid forces the manager to work harder. If am > &L, the optimal level of dilution is zero. Proposition 2. If Ul < Uo (so that there are levels of dilution where the manager finds it in his interest to let the raid succeed), then the socially optimal level of dilution is greater than or equal to the privately optimal level.
Proof
The raid occurs with <? > 4 and not otherwise. The optimal level of dilution contingent on a raid not occurring is zero. With this level of dilution, the return to both society and shareholder is q(dM). When a raid occurs, the return to society exceeds q(aM) (since V > q(aM) has been assumed) and the return to the shareholder is V ? $. Thus, the planner always wants the takeover to occur, which is achieved by setting $ > $. Shareholders want the takeover to occur with the
minimum level of dilution consistent with takeover, $, if V ? & > ({(clm). In all other situations, shareholders want the takeover to be thwarted and no dilution. ?
The reason the socially and privately optimal levels of dilution may differ in this case is the managerial incentive constraint. The first-best scenario entails the raid occurring with no managerial resistance. To eliminate managerial resistance requires setting the level of dilution above S. But with the level of dilution set infinitesimally above S, shareholder utility is V ? S, which may be less than with no dilution, q(aM). From the perspective of society, the dilution needed to eliminate managerial resistance is merely a transfer from the shareholder to the raider. But, from the shareholder's perspective, the dilution is a cost.
In the certainty case, therefore, the socially optimal dilution factor is greater than or equal to the privately optimal dilution factor. This implies that if govern? ment intervention is merited, it should entail facilitating takeovers. We shall see in the next section, however, that this result does not extend to the situation where the cost of takeover is uncertain.
V. V and C Both Stochastic
We Both equations have straightforward interpretations. In (8), the first term is the reduction in the probability of takeover with a unit increase in productive effort, times the salary; the second is the probability of no takeover times the gain in the salary; and the third is the marginal disutility of productive effort. In (9), the first term is the reduction in the probability of takeover with a unit increase in defensive effort, times the salary; and the second is the marginal disutility of defensive effort. The solution to (8) and (9) yields a($) and b($).
We now examine the optimal dilution factor from the shareholder's and from society's perspective. The shareholder's perspective on dilution is examined first. Since dR/d$ > 0 from (13), the first term in square brackets on the RHS of (14) is negative. And since dR/da < 0 from (13) and a($w) > a(@s)> me second term in square brackets on the RHS of (14) The proof for Proposition 3 is global. The following intuition for the result uses a local argument. At the socially optimal level of dilution, a local increase in dilution must cause a decrease in productive effort; otherwise, the local increase in dilution would increase social welfare (both directly and via the increase in productive effort) which is inconsistent with dilution being at the socially optimal level. Since the raider benefits directly from an increase in the dilution factor and also from a decrease in productive effort (since this decreases the expected tender price she must pay), at the socially optimal level of dilution, the raider's return is increasing in the dilution factor. But this implies that at the socially optimal level of dilution, the shareholders' return is decreasing in the dilution factor.
B. Optimal Dilution from the
We now investigate the relationship between the socially optimal and the pri? vately optimal levels of dilution when defensive effort is admitted. We first show that the above argument does not generalize to the situation where defensive effort is variable. To simplify, we consider the opposite extreme where productive effort is fixed at ~d and ignore the possibility that $ % ? 0. An increase in dilution has two effects on social welfare. The direct effect (dW/d$) increases social welfare by increasing the probability of a value-enhancing takeover. The indirect effect op?
erates through defensive effort ((dW/db)(db/d$)). At the socially optimal level of dilution, ^^, the sum of the two effects is zero. Since an increase in defensive effort lowers social welfare (dW/db < 0 from (11)), in the neighborhood of $ ^ a small increase in dilution must induce an increase in defensive effort. Thus, the socially optimal dilution factor weighs the direct benefit from increased dilution against the increase in expected takeover cost from the induced increase in defen? sive effort. Now consider the effect on the raider of an increase in dilution in the neighborhood of the socially optimal dilution factor. She benefits directly from the increase in dilution (dR/d$ > 0) but is adversely affected by the increase in defensive effort (dR/db < 0).19 Hence, at the socially optimal level of dilution, an increase in dilution appears to have an ambiguous effect on the raider's utility and, hence, on shareholder utility. This is indeed the case. We have constructed examples in which the socially optimal level of dilution exceeds that chosen by shareholders, and others in which the socially optimal level of dilution is less than that chosen by shareholders.20 benefit from an incremental increase in dilution above a locally socially optimal level?through a simple numerical example. To simplify, we assume that both the dilution factor and takeover costs take on discrete values. Let i index the dilution factor and j takeover costs, and let Pij denote the probability that the takeover cost is Cj when the dilution factor is $i, which incorporates defensive effort. Takeover Thus, for example, when $ = 1, the manager's choice of defensive effort (which is treated implicitly) results in takeover costs being 0+ with probability 0.05, 1 + with probability 0.05, etc. The form of the probability distribution for C > 4 + is not shown since it does not affect the example. The example is constructed so that increased dilution affects the probability distribution of takeover costs in particu? lar ways. First, it is implicitly assumed that an increase in $ stimulates defensive effect, which, per our assumption that Gb(C, b) < 0, implies that the probability that takeover costs are below a particular level falls; second, when $ increases from two to three, the corresponding increase in defensive effort eliminates the possibility of a takeover being "cheap" (C = 0+ or 1+). Table 1 The first column in Table 1 , panel A indicates that when there is no dilution, the probability that takeover costs are 0+ is 0.10, as is the probability that takeover costs are 1+ is also 0.10 and so on. The probability of takeover is the probability that dilution exceeds takeover costs, which equals zero. The expected surpluses from takeover for society, shareholders, and the raider are, of course, all zero. Also, since there is no threat of takeover, the manager expends zero defensive effort. Now raise dilution to <?= 1. If the manager were to continue to expend zero effort, takeover would occur with probability 0.1. It now pays the manager to exert some effort to defend against takeover. The example assumes that his optimal choice of effort changes the probability distribution of takeover costs such that the probability that takeover costs are 0+ is 0.05, that they are 1+ is 0.05, and so on. Takeover occurs only when the dilution factor exceeds takeover costs, viz. when C = 0+, which occurs with a probability of 0.05. The expected social surplus from takeover is 0.60, the probability of takeover (0.05) times the social surplus when takeover occurs (V ? q ? 0+ = 12); this is divided between expected shareholder surplus (0.05(V-q-$)=0.55) and expected raider surplus (0.05(#-0+)=0.05). When $ is raised to two, the manager further increases his defensive effort. This can be seen by noting that, for the range of C shown, the probability increases that takeover costs are above a given level. Here, takeover occurs when C = 0 + or 1+. W ? q, S -q, and R are calculated by applying (15a)-(15c). indicates that all the expected surpluses rise when $ is raised from one to two. The example's central point of interest occurs when $ is raised from two to three. The manager introduces additional defenses that eliminate the possibility of a cheap takeover but do not prevent the probability of takeover from increasing.
Because the possibility of cheap takeovers is eliminated, expected takeover costs increase by more than the expected gross surplus from takeover, so that social sur? plus falls. But the probability of takeover increases sufficiently that the expected gross surplus from takeover increases by more than expected dilution payments, so that shareholders are better off. Thus shareholders favor the increase from $?2 to $ = 3, even though it is socially undesirable, since their decision calculus does not account for the substantial increase in expected takeover costs resulting from the elimination of the possibility of cheap takeovers.
VI. Conclusion
The takeover boom ofthe mid-1990s raised once again the question of wheth?
er the market for corporate control generates too many takeovers or too few. Pointing to the large gains accruing to shareholders through the takeover process, some have argued that increased takeover activity should be encouraged. Others, viewing these gains as illusory, have argued for increased oversight and regulation of the takeover process. This paper does not attempt to come to grips with the full complexity of the issue. Rather, it focuses on a class of takeover costs that previ? ous theoretical research has tended to overlook?corporate restructuring by man?
agers to defend against takeover. Evidence strongly suggests that such activity is pervasive, quantitatively important, and detrimental to shareholders' long-term interests.
Managerial resistance obviously increases the costs of raids. But it also alters the private and social cost-benefit calculus of takeover. If defensive managerial effort is fixed, the level of takeover activity is too low, since shareholders regard the financial incentives given raiders to stimulate takeover activity as a cost while society views them as a transfer. We showed that admitting defensive restruc? turing by managers upsets this result, implying that an unregulated market for corporate control may generate excessive takeovers. Empirically our model sug? gests that evidence from gains from takeovers may be overstated because they fail to take managerial defensive effort into account. Prior to a takeover, a firm may experience "a huge diversion of managerial effort into devising ways to re? duce vulnerability that did not grow out of managerial inefficiency" (Herman and Lowenstein ( 
